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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a new em-
ployer is bound to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") between a predecessor employer and a union after a change in
ownership in three cases often referred to as the "Successorship Trilogy."
These cases extol the general, though controverted, rule that in forming its
business, a new employer is not bound to its predecessor's collective bar-
gaining agreement and is free to define its own terms of employment.
* Associate at Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, L.L.P. and 2011 graduate of Mississippi College
School of Law. My sincerest thanks go to Professor Judith Johnson for her invaluable assistance and
encouragement in connection with this Article.
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However, to say that this rule is general implies a certain level of consis-
tency between these foundational cases, while in reality a number of lower
courts have found that their rationales are directly at odds.
The first, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, held that a successor
company could be bound to the arbitration provision of a preexisting CBA
in a merger situation where all of the predecessor's assets and its entire
workforce were transferred to the new employer.' A subsequent decision
from the Court, NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, came to the
opposing conclusion that an unconsenting, non-alter ego successor can
never be bound to the terms of a preexisting CBA.2 The third case in the
Trilogy, Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, seems to
fall somewhere in between, preventing an employer from being held to a
predecessor's CBA where there the takeover involved a wholesale transfer
of assets and some retention of the predecessor's workforce.
The lack of consensus between lower courts on how to reconcile these
decisions has resulted in disagreement on the survivability of certain types
of CBA provisions, most prominently those mandating arbitration of griev-
ances between employer and union. This Article is intended to serve as an
insight for labor attorneys and other interested readers into the successor-
ship doctrine and offers clarifications and potential solutions to several of
its lingering dilemmas.
Part Two begins by analyzing each case in the Trilogy, as well as subse-
quent decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts. This is followed
by an exploration into the preference for arbitration in national labor pol-
icy, detailing its origins in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), its
purpose of protecting employees from sudden changes in the employment
relationship and avoiding industrial strife, and its impact on the decisions in
the Trilogy.
Part Three discusses the three judicially recognized exceptions to
Burns's rule prohibiting the enforcement of a preexisting agreement
against a successor. The alter ego exception focuses on similarities be-
tween the old and new employers' corporate identity, while the "perfectly
clear successor" and "voluntary adoption" exceptions take into account the
new employer's conduct prior to and during the transition in ownership. It
is concluded that a new employer may be bound to the substantive terms of
preexisting CBA only if one of these exceptions applies.
Finally, Part Four examines the contrasting approaches taken by the
Third Circuit in Ameristeel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and the Second Circuit in Local 348-S, UFCW, AFL-CIO v. Meridian Man-
agement Corp. on the issue of whether a duty to arbitrate may be imputed
to a new employer even when the other substantive terms of a preexisting
CBA would be unenforceable. Although the Second Circuit raises some
salient policy concerns, the Third Circuit's rationale more appropriately
1. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
2. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 275 (1972).
3. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
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balances these interests with the cautionary admonition of Burns and How-
ard Johnson that such an extra-contractual duty is only proper under ex-
tremely limited circumstances. As a result, arbitration provisions-like
other terms of a collective bargaining agreement-cannot be enforced
against an unconsenting, non-alter ego successor if the integrity of the Tril-
ogy is to be preserved.
II. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK-THE SUCCESSORSHIP TRILOGY
A. Wiley, Burns, and Howard Johnson
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of successor liability
in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston. Two publishing companies, Inter-
science Publishers ("Interscience") and John Wiley & Sons ("Wiley") en-
tered into a merger agreement wherein Interscience ceased its separate
corporate existence.' Interscience had entered into a CBA with District 65,
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO ("District 65")
as its representative bargaining unit, but the CBA contained no provision
making it binding on successor employers.' After the merger, Wiley re-
tained all eighty former Interscience employees, including forty formerly
represented by District 65, and rejected District 65's demand for recogni-
tion as a representative bargaining unit because, it contended, the merger
had voided the CBA.6 District 65 then brought suit against Wiley under
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)7 to compel arbi-
tration of several disputes that it alleged were subject to the arbitration
provision in the Interscience CBA.'
The Court began by recapitulating "the central role of arbitration in
[e]ffectuating national labor policy" and preventing "industrial strife,"'
noting that "[i]t would derogate from '[t]he federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration' . . . if a change in the corporate structure or owner-
ship of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence of removing a
duty to arbitrate previously established[.]""o While acknowledging that
general contract principles would preclude binding a party to an agreement
to which it had not consented, the Court observed that CBAs are uniquely
imbued with the concerns of national labor policy, including the preference
for arbitration over litigation." The pro-arbitration view derives from the
4. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 546.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
8. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 546. District 65 sought primarily to arbitrate on the effect of the Wiley
merger on certain provisions in the Interscience CBA regarding seniority rights, pension fund contribu-
tions, grievance procedures, severance pay, and vacation pay. Id.
9. Id. at 549 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960)).
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perceived need to protect employees from "sudden change[s] in the em-
ployment relationship."1 2 The Court stated that these "impressive policy
considerations .. . are not wholly overborne by the fact that Wiley did not
sign the contract being construed.""
The Court ultimately determined that Wiley was bound to the arbitra-
tion provision, even though it had not signed or otherwise assented to the
Interscience CBA.14 The Court-in a holding so cautiously confined that
the Court later referred to it as "guarded" and "almost tentative" 1 5
stated:
[T]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not auto-
matically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement,
and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor em-
ployer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement.16
The "appropriate circumstances" mentioned in Wiley were not clearly
articulated, but the Court explained that "the lack of any substantial con-
tinuity of identity in the business enterprise before and after the change [in
ownership]" and the new employer's conduct should be taken into ac-
count.17 The Court found that Wiley's operations exemplified "substantial
continuity of identity" in operations through "the wholesale transfer of In-
terscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty."'"
Wiley was thus required to recognize District 65 as its representative bar-
gaining unit and submit to arbitration to determine the enforceability of
the Interscience CBA. In essence, Wiley held that, where a new employer's
operations mimic those of its predecessor, the foundational contract princi-
ple of mutual assent is subordinate to federal labor policy and renders an
arbitration provision from a preexisting agreement enforceable.
The Court examined a similar issue in NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc., in which an incumbent union filed an unfair labor
practices charge against a new employer under sections 8(a)(1) and
12. Id.; see infra discussion at Part I.B.
13. Id. at 550.
14. Id. at 550-51.
15. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
16. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added).
17. This portion, the most oft-cited language from Wiley, bears repeating in full here:
"We do not hold that in every case in which the ownership or structure of an enterprise is
changed the duty to arbitrate survives . . . . [Tlhere may be cases in which the lack of any
substantial continuity before and after a change would make a duty to arbitrate something
imposed from without, not reasonably to be found in the particular bargaining agreement and
the acts of the parties involved."
Id. at 551. It is important to note that the Court phrases the importance of substantial continuity of
operations in the negative-i.e., that a lack of substantial continuity is a determinative factor against
successor liability. Some lower courts have erroneously interpreted this language inversely, holding
that the presence of substantial continuity alone is sufficient to establish contractual liability. The
problems with this approach and the direct conflicts it poses with Burns are discussed infra at Part
IV.A.
18. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551.
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8(a)(5)19 of the NLRA.2 0 After Burns International Security Services, Inc.
("Burns") replaced Wackenhut Corp. ("Wackenhut") as the security ser-
vices provider at a Lockheed Aircraft Service facility and hired a majority
of its security guards, Burns declined to recognize the union that had re-
cently been certified as the bargaining unit for the guards or to honor its
CBA with Wackenhut.2 1 Observing the legislative history of federal labor
laws and prior decisions of the NLRB, the Court held that "although suc-
cessor employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union,
they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining
contract negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by
them."22
The Burns Court declined to apply the Wiley rationale for three rea-
sons. First, the Court explained that Wiley's holding was partially based on
"a background of state law that embodied the general rule that in merger
situations [sic] the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the
disappearing corporation."2 3 There was no similar merger in Burns; rather,
the successor merely outbid its predecessor for a contract and did not
purchase any assets from it.24 Burns was obligated under section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA to recognize and bargain with the union because it hired a ma-
jority of its predecessor's represented employees.2 5 However, this alone
did not trigger the contractual obligations that typically flow from "a
merger, stock acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase[.]" 2 6
Second, the Court stated that a successor's duty to honor a predeces-
sor's CBA does not automatically attach when there is substantial con-
tinuity of identity between the two businesses. 27 While the new employer
may be inclined, and in many cases well advised, to adopt the prior agree-
ment in order to preserve the employees' expectations and reduce the like-
lihood of union turmoil, it cannot be legally forced to do so. 2 8 Third, the
19. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees, subject to provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1974). Section 159(a) states that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1974).
20. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 275 (1972). Although the Burns Court
pointed out that Wiley was a suit to compel arbitration under the LMRA while Burns was an unfair
labor practices suit under the NLRA, the prevailing view is that-despite this difference in the nature
of the two claims-each decision remains applicable in suits involving both the LMRA and NLRA. See
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256 ("It would be plainly inconsistent ... to say that the basic policies
found controlling in an unfair labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit under [§]
301" because to do so would make the employer's rights contingent "upon the forum in which the union
presses its claims.").
21. Burns, 406 U.S. at 275.
22. Id. at 284.
23. Id. at 286.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 286-87.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 291.
28. Id.; see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) ("The transition
from one corporate organization to another will in most cases be eased and industrial strife avoided if
2012]1 89
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Court held that while "[p]reventing industrial strife is an important aim of
federal labor legislation, ... Congress has not chosen to make the bargain-
ing freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to this goal."29
This concern is of great importance since employers will be discouraged
from taking over businesses with financial or other operational woes if they
can expect to be bound to an unappealing agreement between the failing
business and a union.30 Alternatively, a union may wish to renegotiate a
CBA that includes concessions made to a smaller predecessor company
that the unit is unwilling to make a larger, more economically powerful
successor. 3 1  Consequently, the Court explained that Wiley's focus on
preventing industrial strife would best be achieved by a rule that stops
short of imputing contractual terms to employers and unions that "do not
correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties."32
Two years after Burns, the Court again addressed successor liability in
Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, in which Howard
Johnson Co. ("Howard Johnson") acquired a restaurant, motor lodge, and
other assets formerly belonging to a corporation operated by the Grissom
family ("Grissom").3 3 Only nine of the fifty-three workers formerly em-
ployed by the Grissom were hired after the corporate transition.3 4 The
union representing employees of the restaurant and motor lodge brought
suit under section 301 of the LMRA, claiming that Howard Johnson's re-
fusal to hire the entire pool of represented employees constituted an un-
lawful "lockout" in violation of the prior CBA between the union and
Grissom, and seeking to compel Howard Johnson to arbitrate the issue of
its liability under this agreement.35
Rather than directly address the conflict between Wiley and Burns, the
Howard Johnson Court held that "even on its own terms, Wiley does not
support the decision of the courts below" since there was clearly no sub-
stantial continuity in the workforces of Grissom and Howard Johnson.3 6
Therefore, the Court did not need to reach the more difficult issue of
whether, if substantial continuity existed, the factual circumstances would
be appropriate to require Howard Johnson to arbitrate the extent of its
liability under Grissom's CBA. Moreover, the Court factually distin-
guished Wiley, explaining that although there is generally no reason for
separating situations involving mergers, consolidations, or sales of assets,
employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration rather than by 'the relative strength of the
contending forces[.]' ") (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 580 (1960)).
29. Burns, 406 U.S. at 291.
30. Id. at 287-88.
31. Id. at 288.
32. Id.
33. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 250 (1974).
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id. at 252-53.
36. Id. at 256. 262-63.
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the state laws governing the merger in Wiley created a reasonable expecta-
tion for the parties that the duty to arbitrate would remain in effect." Fi-
nally, while making special efforts not to fill in the analytical gaps left by
Wiley and Burns, the Court repeatedly expressed its preference for a
broader application of Burns and a more stringent and cautious approach
to Wiley.38
B. The Steelworkers Trilogy and National Labor Policy's Preference
for Arbitration
The starting point for any discussion of labor policy must begin with
the congressional motivations behind the NLRA, also known as the Wag-
ner Act, which governs the collective bargaining process between employ-
ers and unions.39 Collective bargaining agreements are intended to
regulate most aspects of the employer-union relationship and prevent the
unfair outcomes that would result if disputes were decided based on "the
relative strength, at any given moment, of the contending forces."4 0 The
NLRA states:
[The] protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bar-
gain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or inter-
ruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.4 1
In furtherance of these goals, arbitration of disputes remains a funda-
mental tenet of labor relations intended to help prevent labor strikes and
other forms of industrial strife.42
The Court in Wiley underscored this ideal, noting that "[tihe objectives
of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law,
require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange
their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced
by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employ-
ment relationship." 43
In 1960, the Supreme Court expounded the national labor policy
favoring arbitration in three cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.4 4 In
United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., an employee brought
37. Id. at 257.
38. Id. at 256-64; see also Ameristeel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 272 (3d. Cir.
2001) (noting that Howard Johnson "downplays the significance of Wiley ... and focus[es] on the
limited factual context in which [it] arose," and at the same time "takes an expansive view of Burns,
repeatedly extolling its reasoning").
39. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2000).
40. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
41. 29 U.S.C. §151 (1947).
42. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578.
43. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
44. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion, 363 U.S. at 574; Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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an action against his employer for compensation benefits after he was
forced to leave work due to an injury.45 The parties reached a settlement
after a physician diagnosed the employee as being permanently partially
disabled.4 6 After two weeks, the union filed a grievance with the employer
claiming that the employee was entitled to return to work under the senior-
ity provision of the CBA.4 7 When the employer refused to arbitrate, the
union brought suit and the district court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the employee could not claim se-
niority rights because he had accepted the disability settlement.48 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed on separate grounds, finding that the grievance was
"frivolous" and "not subject to arbitration."4 9
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "courts .. . have no business
weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in
a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in
the written instrument which will support the claim." 0 Instead, the Court
urged that the dispute should have been submitted to arbitration." The
court admonished that "[w]hen the judiciary undertakes to determine the
merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance proce-
dure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function . . . entrusted
to the arbitration tribunal."52
In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,
a union filed a grievance after an employer discharged a group of union
employees and contracted out their former duties, alleging that the em-
ployer engaged in a partial lockout of union employees in violation of the
CBA. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
CBA did not authorize arbitral review of managerial hiring practices and
further held that the choice to contract out work was a permissible exercise
of the employer's professional business judgment.s" The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the decision to contract out work fell under "matters
which are strictly a function of management," which were excluded from
the CBA's grievance procedure and thus not subject to arbitration.
As it had done in American Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court
reversed, emphasizing the indispensability of arbitration in labor dis-
putes.5 6 The Court described arbitration as a "substitute for industrial





50. Id. at 569.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 575 (1960).
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 578.
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strife" and "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process[.]"5 7 Fur-
thermore, while acknowledging that the decision to contract out work was
a function of management, the Court rejected the appellate court's deter-
mination that such decisions were necessarily excluded from the CBA's
grievance procedure.58 The Court explained that "[a]n order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an inter-
pretation that covers the asserted dispute."5 9 This issue-whether con-
tracting out work was explicitly excluded from arbitration under the
language of the CBA-was one that the arbitrator should determine."o
Finally, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., a
group of union employees was discharged after they left their positions in
protest of another employee's termination."' The union filed a grievance,
and when the employer refused to arbitrate, the union brought suit to en-
force the CBA.62 After the district court ordered arbitration, the arbitrator
found that the employees acted improperly in leaving their positions, but
that their punishment should have been at most a ten-day suspension and
not termination.6 3 As a result, the arbitrator "awarded reinstatement with
back pay, minus pay for a 10-day suspension and such sums as these em-
ployees received from other employment. "64
The district court ordered the employer to comply with the arbitration
order after the employer's initial refusal.65 The Fourth Circuit agreed that
the district court had the authority to enforce the arbitration award, but
nevertheless found the award to be unenforceable on two grounds.66 First,
it failed to specify the amounts that should be deducted from the backpay
award; the court found that this defect could be cured by an order directing
the parties to complete arbitration. 67 Second, the court found that the arbi-
trator's orders for backpay and reinstatement could not be enforced be-
cause the CBA had expired at the time of the award.68
The Supreme Court once again reversed." Although the Court
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the parties should complete arbitration
in order to reach a determination on the specific amounts of backpay due,
it rejected the second basis for its decision.70 The Court found that the
arbitrator's rationale for extending the award of backpay past the date of
57. Id.
58. Id. at 583.
59. Id. at 582-83.
60. Id. at 585.




65. Id. at 595.
66. Id. at 596.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 599.
70. Id.
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expiration of the CBA and ordering reinstatement was unclear, but ambi-
guity in an arbitrator's opinion does not justify a court's refusal to enforce
the award." In a famous passage, the Court stated that "an arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial jus-
tice."72 The Court explained that issues of contract interpretation should
be left to the limited discretion of the arbitrator, while courts should avoid
unnecessary interference by declining to review the merits of an arbitration
award.73
The Steelworkers Trilogy demonstrates the inviolate relationship be-
tween labor and arbitration that served as the primary motivation behind
the Supreme Court's opinion in Wiley. Appreciation of this essential policy
concern is essential if Wiley is to remain relevant in the successorship
debate.
C. Fall River and a Post-Trilogy Framework for Successorship
In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, the Court provided
three factors that must be taken into account in assessing operational con-
tinuity: (1) whether the nature of the businesses remains essentially the
same after the change in employers; (2) whether the new employer's work-
ers perform the same jobs under the same working conditions and supervi-
sors; and (3) whether the new employer provides the same products and
production processes and serves basically the same customer base.74 Fall
River presented a factual situation where the question of operational con-
tinuity was more difficult to answer, which may explain why the Court de-
vised this list of objective criteria to aid its analysis.
Sterlingware Corp. ("Sterlingware"), a textile dyeing company located
in Fall River, Massachusetts, produced dyed fabrics though two different
processes-converting and commission dyeing. Converting is the process
of dyeing fabric purchased from a wholesaler and later selling the finished
product to apparel manufacturers, while commission dyeing involves refin-
ishing fabric supplied by private customers. 76 Feeling the economic effects
of a market that had largely evaporated due to foreign competition, the
company sold its machinery and other assets and terminated most of its
workforce, leaving only a "skeleton crew" to ship out remaining orders."
After the company eventually went out of business, a former officer of
Sterlingware entered into a partnership with the president of one of its
largest customers for the purpose of starting an exclusively commission-
based dyeing business utilizing Sterlingware's workforce and assets.
71. Id. at 598.
72. Id. at 597.
73. Id. at 596.
74. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987).
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 31.
78. Id. at 32.
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After its formation, Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
("Fall River") began operating out of Sterlingware's former facility; of its
initial stock of twelve supervisors, eleven were former Sterlingware em-
ployees.79 Around this time, Fall River rejected a request for recognition
as a representative bargaining unit by the United Textile Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 292 ("United Textile"), which had represented
Sterlingware's employees for nearly thirty years.s0 Within six months, the
company employed a full shift of fifty-five production workers-thirty-six
of whom had formerly worked at Sterlingware-and started fulfilling cus-
tomer orders.8 1 In the subsequent months, Fall River's workforce contin-
ued to grow until eventually former Sterlingware employees had fallen out
of the majority, though they still comprised approximately forty-nine per-
cent of the workforce.82
A panel of the NLRB affirmed the decision of the administrative law
judge that Fall River was a successor to Sterlingware and was obligated to
negotiate with United Textile because, by the time it had hired a "substan-
tial and representative complement" of its workforce, a majority were for-
mer Sterlingware employees.8 3 After the First Circuit enforced the Board's
order, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' The Court noted that al-
though Fall River had altered the nature of the business by eliminating
conversion dyeing from its services, there was a large degree of similarity in
the day-to-day operation of the facility due to the carryover in the
workforce, machinery, working conditions, and supervisory personnel."
Acknowledging that substantial continuity should be determined from the
perspective of the employees in order to promote industrial peace, these
facts were found by the Court to be controlling on the issue of Fall River's
status as a successor.8 6 The Court also formally adopted the three-factor
test used by the NLRB in assessing substantial continuity, which examines
(1) the nature of the businesses; (2) the jobs, working conditions, and su-
pervisors; and (3) the products, production processes, and customer ba-
ses." The Court found that "[a]lthough petitioner abandoned converting
dyeing in exclusive favor of commission dyeing, this change did not alter
the essential nature of the employees' jobs[.]"88 The Court found the sec-
ond and third factors to be dispositive, stating that "both types of dyeing




83. Id. at 34-35.
84. Id. at 35-36.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 43.
87. Id. (citing Aircraft Magnesium, A Div. of Grico Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982)).
88. Id. at 44.
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involved the same production process[,] . . . [tJhe job classifications of peti-
tioner were the same as those of Sterlingware[,] . . . [and] petitioners' em-
ployees worked on the same machines under the direction of supervisors[,]
most of whom were former supervisors of Sterlingware."8 9
How should the legal standard established in Fall River be applied to
future cases? If the Fall River factors lead to a determination of substantial
continuity-which is more of a discretionary standard than a quantifiable
measurement-the new employer is deemed a "successor." This designa-
tion places on the employer a duty to recognize and negotiate in good faith
with the incumbent union.9 0 Although the successor is generally free to set
the initial terms of employment for the workers hired from its predecessor,
it must negotiate with any incumbent union regarding proposed changes in
the represented employees' rights occurring under a preexisting CBA.9 1
Failure to observe this duty by imposing unilateral changes to the repre-
sented employees' rights constitutes an unfair labor practice and may sub-
ject the employer to liability under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.9 2
However, a determination of substantial continuity alone is insufficient to
bind the successor employer to the substantive terms of the predecessor's
CBA.9 3 Such action requires an additional showing of contractual justifica-
tions for imputing the terms of the preexisting agreement to the new
employer. 94
D. Recent Decisions on Substantial Continuity
In a case before the Second Circuit, Century Vertical Systems, Inc.
("Century") purchased another elevator maintenance company, Century
Industrial Services ("Industrial"), but only hired four of its fourteen field
employees. Century filed a section 301 suit against the incumbent union,
seeking a declaration that it was not bound by the arbitration provision in
the Industrial CBA. 9 6 It was undisputed in the suit that Century had not
adopted Industrial's CBA by consent or as an alter ego.97 Nevertheless,
the district court agreed with the union that Century's operations were
"substantially continuous" with those of Industrial, and thus was required
to arbitrate with the union pursuant to Industrial's CBA.9"
However, the court of appeals reversed, determining that the meager
overlap in the workforces of the two companies could not justify the impo-
sition of a contractual duty to arbitrate.99 The Second Circuit, in Century
89. Id.
90. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972).
91. Id. at 294-95.
92. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006).
93. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 284.
94. See supra discussion at Part III.
95. Century Vertical Sys., Inc. v. Local No. 1, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, No. 09-4257,
379 Fed. Appx. 68, 71 (2d Cir. May 28, 2010).
96. Id. at 70.
97. Id. at 71.
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id. at 71.
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Vertical and its prior opinion in Meridian Management00 , labors under an
erroneous interpretation of the successorship analysis laid out in the Tril-
ogy. The court seemingly conflates or disregards the importance of distin-
guishing the duty under labor law to bargain with a predecessor's union
from the duty under contract law to abide by the terms of the predecessor's
CBA. The court instead merges these two duties into a more homologous
concept of general successor liability, under which a successor is not only
required to recognize an incumbent union, but must honor the arbitration
provision in a CBA which it has not adopted either formally or informally.
As will be discussed, this view is directly at odds with the Supreme Court's
holdings in Burns and Howard Johnson that an unconsenting, non-alter
ego successor cannot be bound to the terms of the predecessor's CBA, re-
gardless of the parallels in workforce or operations, since the substantial
continuity analysis is only relevant to the issue of union recognition.
In a case from a Wisconsin district court, Republic Airway Holdings,
Inc. ("Republic") acquired Midwest Airlines, Inc. ("Midwest") and made it
a subsidiary, although Midwest continued to operate independently for a
brief period.0' After Midwest officially ceased operations, Republic hired
37 of Midwest's 344 total pilots and assigned them to employment with
several of its other subsidiaries. 102 The union representing the pilots filed
suit against Republic for various grievances under the CBA it had formerly
entered into with Midwest. Additionally, the union sought an order declar-
ing that Republic was a successor to Midwest and was bound to its CBA.103
The district court rejected this argument, pointing out that the union
took too expansive a view of the limited holding in Wiley and ignored the
clear directive of Burns that a successor cannot be bound to the substantive
terms of an existing CBA based solely on similarities in workforce and op-
erations between it and a predecessor.104 The court further determined
that the factual circumstances of the case resembled those in Howard John-
son, where the successor purchased all of the predecessor's assets but only
retained a small fraction of its employees.105 Thus, the court held that Re-
public did not bear sufficient continuity with Midwest to justify imposition
of a duty to abide by the CBA.'06
100. Local 348-S, UFCW, AFL-CIO v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2009), dis-
cussed infra at Part IVA.
101. Freitas v. Republic Airways Holdings, Inc., No. 11-C-358, 2011 WL 5506679, at *1 (E.D.
Wisc. Nov. 10, 2011).
102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *6.
106. Id.
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III. BINDING A SUCCESSOR AFTER BURNS-THE ALTER EGO,
PERFECTLY CLEAR SUCCESSOR, AND VOLUNTARY
ADOPTION EXCEPTIONS
The message of Burns is clear: even if there is substantial continuity
and the new employer is required to recognize and negotiate with an in-
cumbent union, it cannot be bound to the substantive terms of its predeces-
sor's CBA to which it has not consented.o10 Metaphorically speaking, the
successor can be forced to sit at the table with the union members, but it
cannot be forced to eat the meal they have prepared. In order to force the
terms of the CBA on the successor, there must be some additional contrac-
tual justification to override the Burns rule that an unconsenting successor
cannot be bound to the preexisting agreement. There are three commonly
accepted situations where this can occur: (1) where there has been a corpo-
rate merger, as in Wiley; (2) where the successor is an alter ego of the
predecessor; and (3) where the successor has consented to the CBA
through its express or implicit conduct.
A. Alter Ego
Under the alter ego theory, a successor may be bound to a predeces-
sor's CBA when there has not been a bona fide change in ownership.'0o
"[T]he focus of 'the alter ego doctrine ... is on the existence of a disguised
continuance or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargain-
ing agreement through a sham transaction or technical change in
operations.' "109
In determining whether two employers are alter egos, courts examine
whether they share "substantially identical management, business purpose,
operation, equipment, customers and supervision, as well as ownership." 10
An additional factor that courts must consider is whether the formation of
the new employer was spurred by anti-union animus or an attempt to avoid
the effects of labor laws.11' Although anti-union animus may be determi-
native for a finding of alter ego status, "if there is substantial evidence dem-
onstrating that other factors are present, lack of anti-union animus will not
defeat an alter ego finding."' 1 2 However, one complication faced by courts
on this issue is disagreement over the proper method of proving anti-union
animus or subversive intent.1 3
107. Id.
108. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
109. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, I.B.T. v. Reg'l Imp. & Exp. Trucking Co., 944 F.2d 1037,
1044 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
507-08 (5th Cir. 1982)).
110. Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976) (citations omitted).
111. Southport Petroleum, 315 U.S. at 105; A&P Brush Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 216, 219 (2d
Cir. 1998).
112. Goodman Piping Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. Compare Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983) (whether the transfer resulted
in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of its
labor obligations), with NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1979) (whether there is
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In J. Vallery Electric, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the Fifth
Circuit held that two companies were alter egos based on their common
ownership and management and the corporations' unlawful motive to
avoid paying for unionized labor as required by a CBA.1 14 Vallery Electric,
Inc. ("Vallery") used non-union labor on numerous electrical contracting
projects in violation of a CBA with an electrical workers union that permit-
ted only union labor.'1 5 After being repeatedly admonished by the union
business manager for doing so, the president formed a new company, J.
Vallery Electric, Inc. ("J. Vallery"), that did not use union labor.116 The
Fifth Circuit found that the companies maintained essentially identical
workforces, management, and services.' 17 The court further found that the
lack of consideration received by the officers for their capital contributions
and the president's anti-union statements demonstrated that "there was not
even a pretense of an arm's length relationship" when the new company
was formed.1 18 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the new company was
bound by the preexisting CBA.119
On the other hand, a New York district court held that a defendant
company, A&M Heating, Air Conditioning, Ventilation & Sheet Metal,
Inc. ("A&M"), was not the alter ego of its predecessor, Hudson Heating,
Inc. ("Hudson") and therefore was not bound by the arbitration clause in
its CBA.12 0 Although Hudson and A&M shared the same business pur-
pose and their operations covered the same general geographic area, they
were owned, managed, and controlled by different individuals.12 ' In addi-
tion, the two companies had not previously been affiliated with any of the
same projects or customers. 1 2 2 Finally, there was no evidence that A&M
was formed with anti-union animus, but rather as a means of reinventing
the owner's business under a new name in order to attract union workers
after the plaintiff union ordered its members to leave the job site and re-
fused to refer other workers to A&M.123
B. "Perfectly Clear" Successor
In Burns, the Court explained that although a successor employer is
usually allowed to set the initial terms of employment for the workers re-
tained after it takes over a predecessor's business, "there will be instances
in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the
substantial evidence that the new business was created for the primary purpose of continuing the prede-
cessor's business while avoiding its obligation to bargain with the incumbent union).
114. J. Vallery Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2003).
115. Id. at 448.
116. Id. at 448-49.
117. Id. at 451.
118. Id. at 452.
119. Id. at 454.
120. Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. A & M Heating, Air
Conditioning, Ventilation & Sheet Metal, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
121. Id. at 347-49.
122. Id. at 349.
123. Id. at 350.
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employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him ini-
tially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes
the terms."' 2 4 The NLRB has limited the application of the "perfectly
clear" successor theory to two situations: where the successor has either (1)
actively or passively "misled employees into believing that they would all
be retained without change in their wages, hours, or conditions of employ-
ment," or (2) invited the employees to accept employment without first
communicating adequately its intention to adopt new terms of employ-
ment. 1 2 5 This exception to the Burns rules is necessitated by the fact that
employees who have received what they perceive as an offer of employ-
ment, and are not informed that their contractual rights will be altered,
"will place significant reliance on that situation and forego other employ-
ment opportunities."1 2 6
C. Implicit Adoption
If a new employer expressly or impliedly assumes its predecessor's
CBA or some part thereof, it may be held to the terms of that agree-
ment. 127 The Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]o determine whether a party
has adopted a contract by its conduct, the relevant inquiry is whether the
party has displayed 'conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms
of the agreement.' "128 For example, where an employer voluntarily imple-
ments some terms of the predecessor's CBA, it will be deemed to have
adopted the agreement in full even though it has not signed or formally
adopted it.129 This frequently happens when a successor makes payments
to employee health, pension, or other fringe benefit accounts in accordance
with the payment schedule from a preexisting CBA.so This principle has
also been extended to a successor's acceptance of a predecessor's CBA by
conformity with the arbitration procedures outlined therein.' 3 '
124. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95. In general, however, the successor's duty to bargain with the
incumbent union does not take effect until the successor hires a representative complement-typically
a majority-of the predecessor's employees. Id. at 295.
125. Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1974) (footnote omitted).
126. Canteen Corp. v. NLRB,103 F.3d 1355, 1364 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 664, 674-75 (D.C. Cir.1978).
127. Hosp. & Inst'l Workers Local 250 v. Pasatiempo Dev. Corp., 627 F.2d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir.
1980) (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 272 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v.
Hotel & Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249. 249 (1974)).
128. S. California Painters & Allied Trade Dist. Council No. 36 v. Best Interiors, Inc., 359 F.3d
1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1981).
129. See, e.g., id. at 1133; Brown v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 354-55 (2d Cir. 1999); Haber-
man Constr. Co., 641 F.2d at 356-57; Arco Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1980).
130. See Seabury Const. Corp. v. Dist. Council of N.Y. & Vicinity of United Bros. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am., 461 F. Supp. 2d 193, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Trustees of Utah Carpenters' & Cement
Masons' Pension Trust v. Indus. Power Contractors Plant Maint. Servs., No. 2:09CV929DAK, 2011 WL
6130932, at *4-5 (D. Utah Dec. 8, 2011).
131. See Local 32BJ v. Coby Grand Concourse, LLC. No. 04-9580. 2006 WL 692000, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006).
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However, the circumstances in which this theory applies are exceed-
ingly narrow.132 To illustrate the reserve with which courts apply this the-
ory, the Second Circuit has approved the NLRB's use of a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof in making the determination of whether
there has been an assumption of a CBA.13 3
IV. THE QUESTION OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
A. The Conflicting Views of Ameristeel Corp. and Meridian
Management Corp.
In 2001, the Third Circuit addressed the Wiley-Burns-Howard Johnson
dichotomy in Ameristeel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
finding that a successor employer had no duty to arbitrate with the incum-
bent union under its predecessor's CBA.13 4 Ameristeel Corp. ("Ameris-
teel"), a steel manufacturer, bought a facility owned by Brocker Rebar Co.
("Brocker Rebar") and hired forty-four of its fifty unionized employees
and four of its executives; Ameristeel was thus required to recognize and
bargain with the incumbent union.13 5 However, in the purchase agreement
and multiple dealings with the union, Ameristeel maintained that it was not
bound by the terms of Brocker Rebar's CBA." 6 The union filed a griev-
ance against Brocker Rebar and Ameristeel, challenging what it viewed as
unilateral changes in the terms of employment by Ameristeel." After the
district court granted Ameristeel's motion to enjoin arbitration of the dis-
pute, the Third Circuit reversed.1 3 s
The court's opinion, written by Judge Rendell, found Burns's procla-
mation that an unconsenting, non-alter ego successor cannot be bound to
the substantive terms of a predecessor's CBA "more persuasive . . . than
the limited holding in Wiley." 1 39 As a result, Ameristeel could not be
bound to the terms of Brocker Rebar's CBA because it had formally re-
jected the agreement multiple times and had never taken any actions to
indicate an intent to abide by its terms.1 4 0 The court also attempted to
correct the widespread misunderstanding of the difference between the re-
quirement that an employer recognize and negotiate with an incumbent
132. See, e.g., Pasatiempo Dev. Corp., 627 F.2d at 1012 (holding that a successor employer who
retained its predecessor's policy for resolution of grievances prior to arbitration was not an adoption of
the agreement to arbitrate); United Steelworkers of Am. v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1342
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that a successor employer's use of arbitration procedures similar to those of
its predecessor did not show implicit adoption of an arbitration provision).
133. Local 32B-32J Serv. Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 845. 850 (2d Cir.
1993); see also U.S. Can Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1135 (1992).
134. Ameristeel Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 277 (3d. Cir. 2001).
135. Id. at 265-66.
136. Id. at 266.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 273.
140. Id.
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union based on its substantial continuity with a predecessor, and the sepa-
rate notion that the employer may be bound to the predecessor's CBA if
one of the exceptions enumerated in Burns applies.14 '
Finally, the court acknowledged the "vital role that arbitration plays in
labor disputes," but insisted that arbitration would be ineffectual in certain
cases because of Burns's rule insulating employers from liability under a
preexisting CBA.142 The futility of arbitration in cases where there is no
legal or contractual basis for successor liability was also a central theme of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Wiley.14 3
The Ameristeel court pointed out that no purpose would be served by
arbitration because the arbitrator would have no contract to construe or
terms to enforce and would therefore not be able to provide any remedy
that could receive judicial sanction.14 4 The court explained that requiring
Ameristeel to submit to arbitration on the issue of its liability under
Brocker Rebar's CBA "would create the paradoxical situation in which
Ameristeel would be forced to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under
the CBA, and yet, because it has no such obligations, the arbitrator would
be powerless to enforce these obligations."' 45 Moreover, the court pre-
empted any argument that the arbitrator could provide a remedy based on
general equitable principles, stating that "such an award would be illegiti-
mate because it would 'simply reflect the arbitrator's own notions of indus-
trial justice . ... "146
Chief Judge Becker issued a dissent arguing that Wiley controlled dis-
position of the case, and thus Ameristeel should be required to arbitrate
the issue of its liability under the prior CBA.14 7 The dissent further as-
serted that the majority's ruling "relegated Wiley to the dustbin of history"
by ignoring its factual similarities with Ameristeel, improperly characteriz-
ing Wiley and Burns as being "in irreconcilable conflict," and unnecessarily
expanding Burns's reach.14 8
Eight years later, in Local 348-S UFCW, AFL-CIO v. Meridian Man-
agement Corp., the Second Circuit found, under facts similar to Ameristeel,
that a successor was obligated to arbitrate the issue of its extent of liability
141. "The 'substantial continuity' concept ... should properly be viewed as a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the imposition of arbitration on an unconsenting successor." Id. at 269.
"[While the existence of substantial continuity is a necessary ingredient, its presence does not necessa-
rily render the new entity bound." Id. at 272 n.3. Indeed, continuity of operations and the degree to
which a successor is bound to a predecessor's CBA are separable concepts and are subject to different
standards of review. See supra note 71.
142. Ameristeel, 267 F.3d at 276.
143. "The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration
cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such
a duty." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964). The Court further stated that
"just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a
fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all." Id.
144. Ameristeel, 267 F.3d at 276.
145. Id. at 276-77.
146. Id. at 277 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
147. Id. at 278 (Becker, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 281-82 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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under its predecessor's CBA, even though it was not necessarily bound to
the other substantive terms of the agreement. 149 Meridian Management
Corp. ("Meridian"), which provided engineering and janitorial services for
a terminal within New York's JFK International Airport, entered into a
subcontract with Christi Cleaning Services ("Christi") to perform its
janitorial services.' Christi and a union representing the terminal em-
ployees had entered into a CBA mandating certain levels of contributions
to employee health and welfare funds and directing all disputes related to
the CBA to arbitration."5 ' Meridian later terminated the subcontract with
Christi, hired over half of Christi's former employees, and began perform-
ing the janitorial responsibilities itself.'5 2 When Meridian denied the
union's request for recognition as the bargaining unit for the former Christi
employees, it brought suit under section 301, seeking to compel Meridian
to arbitrate the issue of its obligations under the Christi CBA.153
The Second Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Hall, concluded
that the issue of Meridian's liability under the preexisting CBA should be
determined through arbitration.'54 The court stated:
Although the obligation to arbitrate arises out of the agreement, and
the case law clearly establishes that a successor is not automatically obli-
gated by the substantive terms, requiring arbitration on this issue is the
most efficient and fair means by which the parties can settle their dispute,
particularly in cases like this one where the dispute arises out of the em-
ployer's refusal to honor a particular term of the CBA. The duty to recog-
nize the union is separate from the duty to arbitrate grievances arising out
of the existing CBA, and the two have different purposes.'
Applying the three Fall River Dyeing factors, the court determined
that there was a high level of continuity between the old and new employ-
ers.'56 The nature of the businesses was nearly identical since Christi and
Meridian both performed janitorial services for other corporate entities. 5 7
Second, Meridian's employees performed the same basic type of jobs in the
same location and under the same working conditions as they had under
Christi.' Third, Meridian provided the same services to the Port Author-
ity of New York, and thus the products and customer bases were identi-
cal.' 5 9 Under these facts, the court held that there had been no notable
changes in operations after the change in ownership from the employees'
perspectives.160 As a result, the court found that Meridian was a successor
149. Local 348-S, UFCW, AFL-CIO v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2009).
150. Id. at 66.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 67.
154. Id. at 76.
155. Id.
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and was bound to the arbitration provision in the Christi CBA.16 1 The
court stated that viewing arbitration provisions as distinct from other sub-
stantive terms of a CBA for purposes of successorship was the most effec-
tive way to balance the competing interests articulated in Wiley, Burns, and
Howard Johnson.162
Two factors weigh against the result reached by the Second Circuit in
Meridian Management and favor the approach adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit in Ameristeel. Initially, every other circuit to address the issue has re-
capitulated Burns's reasoning that a successor cannot be bound to the
substantive provisions of a CBA to which it has not agreed.163 As noted in
Judge Livingston's dissent in Meridian Management, the majority opinion
disregarded well-settled precedent that a successor employer may only be
held to the terms of a predecessor's CBA when one of the common law
justifications for successor liability applies. 1 6 4 Because this was not the
case, the dissent argued that the decision would require "all successor em-
ployers who hire the bulk of a predecessor's employees . . . not only to
bargain with and recognize a union but also to arbitrate with it the extent
to which it is bound by the previous CBA."165 This, the dissent argued,
signified an ill-advised divergence from the rationales of Burns and How-
ard Johnson.16 6
Second, Meridian Management's holding does not successfully advance
the interests of either employer or employee and creates inefficient and
potentially divisive policies for future labor relations. In examining the
Second Circuit's "myopic" conclusion that the imposition of an extra-con-
tractual duty to arbitrate on employers somehow protects employee rights,
another commentator observed:
The long-term effect of this decision is that it encourages future suc-
cessor employers to question whether to retain their predecessors' union-
ized employees. Any employer cognizant of this decision who is in a
situation similar to Meridian will undoubtedly weigh the benefits of retain-
ing experienced workers with the possibly lengthy and expensive pitfalls of
litigating, appealing, arbitrating, and potentially relitigating an erroneous
arbitration award. This decision assures these employers that they can
avoid this hassle by simply firing their predecessor's employees.167
161. Id.
162. Id. at 76.
163. See 3750 Orange Place Ltd. P'ship v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 646, 654 (6th Cir. 2003); Ameristeel
Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 277 (3d. Cir. 2001); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union
No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler, 10 F.3d 1563, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1994); New England Mech., Inc. v. Labor-
ers Local Union 294, 909 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1990; Pasatiernpo, 627 F.2d at 1012; Int'l Union of
Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
164. Meridian Mgmt., 583 F.3d at 79 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 80.
166. Id. at 80-81.
167. Kevin A. Teters, Successor Employer's Obligations Under A Preexisting Collective Bargaining
Agreement: The Second Circuit Misinterprets Supreme Court Decisions and Sets A Harmful Precedent,
76 J. AIR L. & COM. 143, 150 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
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Indeed, if a successor employer knows that by hiring a majority of the
predecessor's workforce, it is not only required to recognize their represen-
tative bargaining unit but is shackled to a CBA that may be adverse to its
own business interests, what motivation would the employer have to retain
these employees? It seems much more likely that the employer would sim-
ply terminate the majority or all of the former workers to eliminate any
possibility that it be deemed "substantially continuous." This harsh reality
was not addressed by the Second Circuit, even though it bears directly on
Wiley's central theme of adopting a policy for successor liability that safe-
guards the rights of both employers and employees in order to avoid labor
unrest and industrial strife.
B. The Path Forward-Synthesizing an Effective
Successorship Paradigm
Deriving an effective methodology from the Trilogy requires a thor-
ough examination of the three decisions-including the factual particulari-
ties and legal ramifications of each-that many courts have been reluctant
to perform. Although Wiley and Burns are clearly at opposite ends of the
spectrum of successorship, they can be reconciled. Synthesizing the two
only requires the same compromise that was central to the holding in How-
ard Johnson-that Wiley's effect on the duty to arbitrate be limited to situ-
ations involving virtual identity of business operations between the
predecessor and successor employers, and that Burns's prohibition on con-
tractual liability be applied in all other scenarios.
This view results in a two-step analysis for successor liability, which
first asks whether there is substantial continuity of identity between the old
and new businesses. There must be substantial continuity of identity in
both the workforces and operations of the two businesses before a succes-
sor can become obligated to recognize and bargain with an incumbent
union. 168 Continuity of workforces is generally found where a new em-
ployer hires a majority of the predecessor's represented employees. 1 6 9
Continuity of operations is a fact-based determination focusing on whether
the new company has " 'acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and
continued, without interruption or substantial change, the predecessor's
business operations.' "170 This type of continuity is measured under the
totality of the circumstances with an eye toward whether "those employees
168. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 263 (1974); see also Citisteel
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 350, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he obligation of a new employer to recog-
nize a union rests on two preconditions: 'a majority of the employees must have worked for the prede-
cessor employer, and there must be continuity of operations.' ") (quoting United Mine Workers Local
1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
169. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263.
170. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987) (citing Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)); see also Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d
6, 12 (2d Cir. 1967).
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who have been retained will understandably view their job situations as
essentially unaltered.""
If substantial continuity exists, the second part of the successorship
analysis comes into play, namely, whether there are additional contractual
justifications for holding the successor to the provisions of the predeces-
sor's CBA. To date, the only circumstances recognized where this can oc-
cur are the three theories discussed in Burns. First, the successor is
contractually bound where it is an alter ego of the predecessor. Second,
where the new employer makes it "perfectly clear" to the predecessor's
employees prior to the transition that they will be retained without change
to their terms of employment, the employees are entitled to continue to
enjoy such rights. Finally, where the employer takes actions consistent with
the intent to adopt and abide by the terms of the preexisting CBA, it may
not subsequently disclaim that agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
The successorship doctrine has been stifled by confusion and uncer-
tainty since its inception. The efforts of the Supreme Court and the circuits
to salvage anything cogent from the quagmire of Wiley, Burns, and Howard
Johnson have proven less than fruitful. Through a careful analysis, how-
ever, it is possible to extrapolate a framework from the Trilogy that honors
both the legal precedent and the policies that underlie federal labor legisla-
tion. Courts should first take into consideration the level of continuity be-
tween two companies utilizing the Fall River factors in determining
whether the employer must recognize and bargain with the incumbent la-
bor union. However, courts should avoid binding a successor to terms of a
predecessor's CBA unless one of the three common law exceptions to
Burns-alter ego, "perfectly clear" successor, or implicit adoption-applies
under the facts of the case.
Furthermore, arbitration provisions should not be allowed to survive
where other substantive terms of a CBA would be unenforceable against
the successor; such a system undermines employer bargaining freedom and
will only result in the conducting of futile arbitration proceedings. By lim-
iting Wiley's application to instances of complete identity between the old
and new employer, and applying Burns and its three recognized exceptions
in all other factual scenarios, the murkiness surrounding successorship can
be clarified and the rights of employers, unions, and workers granted the
most sensible form of protection.
171. Golden State Bottling, 414 U.S. at 184; Pa. Transformer Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 217,
223 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Citisteel, 53 F.3d at 354 (successor liability is a factual determination that
will be upheld on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or the result of arbitrary or erroneous
action by the court) (citing Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43); but see Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo,
485 F.3d 701, 705 (2d Cir 2007) (the extent of a successor employer's obligations under a predecessor's
CBA is a question of law that is reviewed de novo).
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